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Abstract
We consider the problem of minimizing a smooth convex function by reducing the
optimization to computing the Nash equilibrium of a particular zero-sum convex-
concave game. Zero-sum games can be solved using online learning dynamics,
where a classical technique involves simulating two no-regret algorithms that play
against each other and, after T rounds, the average iterate is guaranteed to solve
the original optimization problem with error decaying as O(log T/T ). In this pa-
per we show that the technique can be enhanced to a rate of O(1/T 2) by extend-
ing recent work [25, 28] that leverages optimistic learning to speed up equilibrium
computation. The resulting optimization algorithmderived from this analysis coin-
cides exactly with the well-known NESTEROVACCELERATION [19] method, and
indeed the same story allows us to recover several variants of the Nesterov’s al-
gorithm via small tweaks. We are also able to establish the accelerated linear
rate for a function which is both strongly-convex and smooth. This methodology
unifies a number of different iterative optimization methods: we show that the
HEAVYBALL algorithm is precisely the non-optimistic variant of NESTEROVAC-
CELERATION, and recent prior work already established a similar perspective on
FRANKWOLFE [2, 1].
1 Introduction
One of the most successful and broadly useful tools recently developed within the machine learn-
ing literature is the no-regret framework, and in particular online convex optimization (OCO)
[31]. In the standard OCO setup, a learner is presented with a sequence of (convex) loss func-
tions ℓ1(·), ℓ2(·), . . ., and must make a sequence of decisions x1, x2, . . . from some set K in
an online fashion, and observes ℓt after only having committed to xt. Assuming the sequence
{ℓt} is chosen by an adversary, the learner aims is to minimize the average regret R¯T :=
1
T
(∑T
t=1 ℓt(xt)−minx∈K
∑T
t=1 ℓt(x)
)
against any such loss functions. Many simple algorithms
have been developed for OCO problems—including MIRRORDESCENT, FOLLOWTHEREGULAR-
IZEDLEADER, FOLLOWTHEPERTURBEDLEADER, etc.—and these algorithms exhibit regret guar-
antees that are strong even against adversarial opponents. Under very weak conditions one can
achieve a regret rate of R¯T = O(1/
√
T ), or even R¯T = O(log T/T ) with required curvature on ℓt.
One can apply online learning tools to several problems, but perhaps the simplest is to find the
approximateminimum of a convex function argminx∈K f(x). With a simple reductionwe set ℓt = f ,
and it is easy to show that, via Jensen’s inequality, the average iterate x¯T :=
x1+...+xT
T satisfies
f(x¯T ) ≤ 1T
∑T
t=1 f(xt) =
1
T
∑T
t=1 ℓt(xt) ≤ minx∈K 1T
∑T
t=1 ℓt(x) + R¯T = minx∈K f(x) + R¯T
hence R¯T upper bounds the approximation error. But this reduction, while simple and natural,
is quite limited. For example, we know that when f(·) is smooth, more sophisticated algorithms
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such as FRANKWOLFE and HEAVYBALL achieve convergence rates of O(1/T ), whereas the now-
famous NESTEROVACCELERATION algorithm achieves a rate of O(1/T 2). The fast rate shown by
Nesterov was quite surprising at the time, and many researchers to this day find the result quite
puzzling. There has been a great deal of work aimed at providing a more natural explanation of
acceleration, with a more intuitive convergence proof [30, 4, 11]. This is indeed one of the main
topics of the present work, and we will soon return to this discussion.
Another application of the no-regret framework is the solution of so-called saddle-point prob-
lems, which are equivalently referred to as Nash equilibria for zero-sum games. Given a func-
tion g(x, y) which is convex in x and concave in y (often called a payoff function), define
V ∗ = infx∈K supy g(x, y). An ǫ-equilibrium of g(·, ·) is a pair xˆ, yˆ such that such that
V ∗ − ǫ ≤ infx∈K g(x, yˆ) ≤ V ∗ ≤ supy g(xˆ, y) ≤ V ∗ + ǫ. (1)
One can find an approximate saddle point of the game with the following setup: implement a no-
regret learning algorithm for both the x and y players simultaneously, after observing the actions
{xt, yt}t=1...T return the time-averaged iterates (xˆ, yˆ) =
(
x1+...+xT
T ,
y1+...+yT
T
)
. A simple proof
shows that (xˆ, yˆ) is an approximate equilibrium, with approximation bounded by the average regret
of both players (see Theorem 1). In the case where the function g(·, ·) is biaffine, the no-regret
reduction guarantees a rate of O(1/
√
T ), and it was assumed by many researchers this was the
fastest possible using this framework. But one of the most surprising online learning results to
emerge in recent years established that no-regret dynamics can obtain an even faster rate ofO(1/T ).
Relying on tools developed by [9], this fact was first proved by [24] and extended by [28]. The
new ingredient in this recipe is the use of optimistic learning algorithms, where the learner seeks to
benefit from the predictability of slowly-changing inputs {ℓt}.
We will consider solving the classical convex optimization problem minx f(x), for smooth func-
tions f , by instead solving an associated saddle-point problem which we call the Fenchel Game.
Specifically, we consider that the payoff function g of the game to be
g(x, y) = 〈x, y〉 − f∗(y). (2)
where f∗(·) is the fenchel conjugate of f(·). This is an appropriate choice of payoff function since,
V ∗ = minx f(x) and supy g(xˆ, y) = supy〈xˆ, y〉 − f∗(y) = f(xˆ). Therefore, by the definition of
an ǫ-equilibrium, we have that
Lemma 1. If (xˆ, yˆ) is an ǫ-equilibrium of the Fenchel Game (2), then f(xˆ)−minx f(x) ≤ ǫ.
One can imagine computing the equilibrium of the Fenchel game using no-regret dynamics, and
indeed this was the result of recent work [2] establishing the FRANKWOLFE algorithm as precisely
an instance of two competing learning algorithms.
In the present work we will take this approach even further.
1. We show that, by considering a notion of weighted regret, we can compute equilibria in the
Fenchel game at a rate of O(1/T 2) using no-regret dynamics where the only required con-
dition is that f is smooth. This improves upon recent work [1] on a faster FRANKWOLFE
method, which required strong convexity of f (see Appendix J).
2. We show that the secret sauce for obtaining the fast rate is precisely the use of an optimistic
no-regret algorithm, OPTIMISTICFTL [1], combined with appropriate weighting scheme.
3. We show that, when viewed simply as an optimization algorithm, this method is identically
the original NESTEROVACCELERATION method. In addition, we recover several variants
of NESTEROVACCELERATION (see [18, 20, 22]) using small tweaks of the framework.
4. We show that if one simply plays FOLLOWTHELEADER without optimism, the resulting
algorithm is precisely the HEAVYBALL. The latter is known to achieve a suboptimal rate
in general, and our analysis sheds light on this difference.
5. Under the additional assumption that function f(·) is strongly convex, we show that an
accelerated linear rate can also be obtained from the game framework.
6. Finally, we show that the same equilibrium framework can also be extended to composite
optimization and lead to a variant of Accelerated Proximal Method.
Related works: In recent years, there are growing interest in giving new interpretations of Nes-
terov’s accelerated algorithms. For example, [29] gives a unified analysis for some Nesterov’s accel-
erated algorithms [20, 21, 22], using the standard techniques and analysis in optimization literature.
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[16] connects the design of accelerated algorithms with dynamical systems and control theory. [7]
gives a geometric interpretation of the Nesterov’s method for unconstrained optimization, inspired
by the ellipsoid method. [11] studies the Nesterov’s methods and the HEAVYBALL method for
quadratic non-strongly convex problems by analyzing the eigen-values of some linear dynamical
systems. [4] proposes a variant of accelerated algorithms by mixing the updates of gradient descent
and mirror descent and showing the updates are complementary. [27, 30] connect the acceleration
algorithms with differential equations. In recent years there has emerged a lot of work where learn-
ing problems are treated as repeated games [17, 3], and many researchers have been studying the
relationship between game dynamics and provable convergence rates [5, 12, 10].
We would like to acknowledge George Lan for his excellent notes titled “Lectures on Optimization
for Machine Learning” (unpublished). In parallel to the development of the results in this paper,
we discovered that Lan had observed a similar connection between NESTEROVACCELERATION and
repeated game playing (Chapter 3.4). A game interpretation was given by George Lan and Yi Zhou
in Section 2.2 of [15].
2 Preliminaries
Convex functions and conjugates. A function f on Rd is L-smooth w.r.t. a norm ‖ · ‖ if f is
everywhere differentiable and it has lipschitz continuous gradient ‖∇f(u)−∇f(v)‖∗ ≤ L‖u− v‖,
where ‖ · ‖∗ denotes the dual norm. Throughout the paper, our goal will be to solve the problem
of minimizing an L-smooth function f(·) over a convex set K. We also assume that the optimal
solution of x∗ := argminx∈K f(x) has finite norm. For any convex function f , its Fenchel conjugate
is f∗(y) := supx∈dom(f)〈x, y〉−f(x). If a function f is convex, then its conjugate f∗ is also convex.
Furthermore, when the function f(·) is strictly convex, we have that∇f(x) = argmax
y
〈x, y〉−f∗(y).
Suppose we are given a differentiable functionφ(·), then the Bregman divergenceVc(x)with respect
to φ(·) at a point c is defined as Vc(x) := φ(x) − 〈∇φ(c), x − c〉 − φ(c). Let ‖ · ‖ be any norm on
R
d. When we have that Vc(x) ≥ σ2 ‖c− x‖2 for any x, c ∈ dom(φ), we say that φ(·) is a σ-strongly
convex functionwith respect to ‖ ·‖. Throughout the paper we assume that φ(·) is 1-strongly convex.
No-regret zero-sum game dynamics. Let us now consider the process of solving a zero-sum game
via repeatedly play by a pair of online learning strategies. The sequential procedure is described in
Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Computing equilibrium using no-regret algorithms
1: Input: sequence α1, . . . , αT > 0
2: for t = 1, 2, . . . , T do
3: y-player selects yt ∈ Y = Rd by OAlgy .
4: x-player selects xt ∈ X by OAlgx, possibly with knowledge of yt.
5: y-player suffers loss ℓt(yt) with weight αt, where ℓt(·) = −g(xt, ·).
6: x-player suffers loss ht(xt) with weight αt, where ht(·) = g(·, yt).
7: end for
8: Output (x¯T , y¯T ) :=
(∑T
s=1 αsxs
AT
,
∑T
s=1 αsys
AT
)
.
In this paper, we consider Fenchel game with weighted losses depicted in Algorithm 1, following
the same setup as [1]. In this game, the y-player plays before the x-player plays and the x-player
sees what the y-player plays before choosing its action. The y-player receives loss functions αtℓt(·)
in round t, in which ℓt(y) := f
∗(y) − 〈xt, y〉, while the x-player see its loss functions αtht(·) in
round t, in which ht(x) := 〈x, yt〉− f∗(yt). Consequently, we can define the weighted regret of the
x and y players as
α-REGy :=
∑T
t=1 αtℓt(yt)−miny
∑T
t=1 αtℓt(y) (3)
α-REGx :=
∑T
t=1 αtht(xt)−
∑T
t=1 αtht(x
∗) (4)
Notice that the x-player’s regret is computed relative to x∗ the minimizer of f(·), rather than the min-
imizer of
∑T
t=1 αtht(·). Although slightly non-standard, this allows us to handle the unconstrained
setting while Theorem 1 still holds as desired.
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At times when we want to refer to the regret on another sequence y′1, . . . , y
′
T we may refer to this
as α-REG(y′1, . . . , y
′
T ). We also denote At as the cumulative sum of the weights At :=
∑t
s=1 αs
and the weighted average regret α-REG := α-REGAT . Finally, for offline constrained optimization
(i.e. minx∈K f(x)), we let the decision space of the benchmark/comparator in the weighted regret
definition to be X = K; for offline unconstrained optimization, we let the decision space of the
benchmark/comparator to be a norm ball that contains the optimum solution of the offline problem
(i.e. contains argminx∈Rn f(x)), which means that X of the comparator is a norm ball. We let
Y = Rd be unconstrained.
Theorem 1. [1] Assume a T -length sequence α are given. Suppose in Algorithm 1 the online
learning algorithms OAlgx and OAlgy have the α-weighted average regret α-REG
x
and α-REG
y
respectively. Then the output (x¯T , y¯T ) is an ǫ-equilibrium for g(·, ·), with ǫ = α-REGx +α-REGy.
3 An Accelerated Solution to the Fenchel Game via Optimism
We are going to analyzemore closely the use of Algorithm 1, with the help of Theorem 1, to establish
a fast method to compute an approximate equilibrium of the Fenchel Game. In particular, we will
establish an approximation factor of O(1/T 2) after T iterations, and we recall that this leads to a
O(1/T 2) algorithm for our primary goal of solvingminx∈K f(x).
3.1 Analysis of the weighted regret of the y-player (i.e. the gradient player)
A very natural online learning algorithm is FOLLOWTHELEADER, which always plays the point
with the lowest (weighted) historical loss
FOLLOWTHELEADER yˆt := argminy
{∑t−1
s=1 αsℓs(y)
}
.
FOLLOWTHELEADER is known to not performwell against arbitrary loss functions, but for strongly
convex ℓt(·) one can prove an O(log T/T ) regret bound in the unweighted case. For the time being,
we shall focus on a slightly different algorithm that utilizes “optimism” in selecting the next action:
OPTIMISTICFTL y˜t := argminy
{
αtℓt−1(y) +
∑t−1
s=1 αsℓs(y)
}
.
This procedure can be viewed as an optimistic variant of FOLLOWTHELEADER since the algorithm
is effectively making a bet that, while ℓt(·) has not yet been observed, it is likely to be quite similar
to ℓt−1. Within the online learning community, the origins of this trick go back to [9], although their
algorithm was described in terms of a 2-step descent method. This was later expanded by [24] who
coined the term optimistic mirror descent (OMD), and who showed that the proposed procedure can
accelerate zero-sum game dynamics when both players utilize OMD. OPTIMISTICFTL, defined as
a “batch” procedure, was first presented in [1] and many of the tools of the present paper follow
directly from that work.
For convenience, we’ll define δt(y) := αt(ℓt(y) − ℓt−1(y)). Intuitively, the regret will be small if
the functions δt are not too big. This is formalized in the following lemma.
Lemma 2. For an arbitrary sequence {αt, ℓt}t=1...T , the regret of OPTIMISTICFTL satisfies
α-REGy(y˜1, . . . , y˜T ) ≤
∑T
t=1 δt(y˜t)− δt(yˆt+1).
Proof. Let Lt(y) :=
∑t
s=1 αsℓs(y) and also L˜t(y) := αtℓt−1(y) +
∑t−1
s=1 αsℓs(y).
α-REG(y˜1:T ) :=
∑T
t=1 αtℓt(y˜t)− LT (yˆT+1) =
∑T
t=1 αtℓt(y˜t)− L˜T (yˆT+1)− δT (yˆT+1)
≤ ∑Tt=1 αtℓt(y˜t)− L˜T (y˜T )− δT (yˆT+1)
=
∑T−1
t=1 αtℓt(y˜t)− LT−1(y˜T ) + δT (y˜T )− δT (yˆT+1)
≤ ∑T−1t=1 αtℓt(y˜t)− LT−1(yˆT ) + δT (y˜T )− δT (yˆT+1)
= α-REG(y˜1:T−1) + δT (y˜T )− δT (yˆT+1).
The bound follows by induction on T .
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The result from Lemma 2 is generic, and would hold for any online learning problem. But for the
Fenchel game, we have a very specific sequence of loss functions, ℓt(y) := −g(xt, y) = f∗(y) −
〈xt, y〉. With this in mind, let us further analyze the regret of the y player.
For the time being, let us assume that the sequence of xt’s is arbitrary. We define
x¯t :=
1
At
∑t
s=1 αsxs and x˜t :=
1
At
(αtxt−1 +
∑t−1
s=1 αsxs).
It is critical that we have two parallel sequences of iterate averages for the x-player. Our final
algorithm will output x¯T , whereas the Fenchel game dynamics will involve computing ∇f at the
reweighted averages x˜t for each t = 1, . . . , T .
To prove the key regret bound for the y-player, we first need to state some simple technical facts.
yˆt+1 = argmin
y
t∑
s=1
αs (f
∗(y)− 〈xs, y〉) = argmax
y
〈x¯t, y〉 − f∗(y) = ∇f(x¯t) (5)
y˜t = ∇f(x˜t) (following same reasoning as above), (6)
x˜t − x¯t = αt
At
(xt−1 − xt). (7)
Equations 5 and 6 follow from elementary properties of Fenchel conjugation and the Legendre
transform [26]. Equation 7 follows from a simple algebraic calculation.
Lemma 3. Suppose f(·) is a convex function that is L-smooth with respect to the the norm ‖ ·‖ with
dual norm ‖ · ‖∗. Let x1, . . . , xT be an arbitrary sequence of points. Then, we have
α-REGy(y˜1, . . . , y˜T ) ≤ L
∑T
t=1
α2t
At
‖xt−1 − xt‖2. (8)
Proof. Following Lemma 2, and noting that here we have δt(y) = αt〈xt−1 − xt, y〉, we have
∑T
t=1 αtℓt(y˜t)− αtℓt(y∗) ≤
∑T
t=1 δt(y˜t)− δt(yˆt+1) =
∑T
t=1 αt〈xt−1 − xt, y˜t − yˆt+1〉
(Eqns. 5, 6) =
∑T
t=1 αt〈xt−1 − xt,∇f(x˜t)−∇f(x¯t)〉
(Hölder’s Ineq.) ≤ ∑Tt=1 αt‖xt−1 − xt‖‖∇f(x˜t)−∇f(x¯t)‖∗
(L-smoothness of f ) ≤ L∑Tt=1 αt‖xt−1 − xt‖‖x˜t − x¯t‖
(Eqn. 7) = L
∑T
t=1
α2t
At
‖xt−1 − xt‖‖xt−1 − xt‖
as desired.
We notice that a similar bound is given in [1] for the gradient player using OPTIMISTICFTL, yet
the above result is a stict improvement as the previous work relied on the additional assumption that
f(·) is strongly convex. The above lemma depends only on the fact that f has lipschitz gradients.
3.2 Analysis of the weighted regret of the x-player
In the present section we are going to consider that the x-player uses MIRRORDESCENT for updating
its action, which is defined as follows.
xt := argminx∈K αtht(x) +
1
γt
Vxt−1(x) = argminx∈K γt〈x, αtyt〉+ Vxt−1(x), (9)
where we recall that the Bregman divergence Vx(·) is with respect to a 1-strongly convex regulariza-
tion φ. Also, we note that the x-player has an advantage in these game dynamics, since xt is chosen
with knowledge of yt and hence has knowledge of the incoming loss ht(·).
Lemma 4. Let the sequence of xt’s be chosen according to MIRRORDESCENT. Assume that the
Bregman Divergence is uniformly bounded on K, so that D = supt=1,...,T Vxt(x∗), where x∗ de-
notes the minimizer of f(·). Assume that the sequence {γt}t=1,2,... is non-increasing. Then we have
α-REGx ≤ DγT −
∑T
t=1
1
2γt
‖xt−1 − xt‖2.
The proof of this lemma is quite standard, and we postpone it to Appendix A. We also note that the
benchmark x∗ is always within a finite norm ball by assumption. We given an alternative to this
lemma in the appendix, when γt = γ is fixed, in which case we can instead use the more natural
constantD = Vx1(x
∗).
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3.3 Convergence Rate of the Fenchel Game
Theorem 2. Let us consider the output (x¯T , y¯T ) of Algorithm 1 under the following conditions:
(a) the sequence {αt} is positive but otherwise arbitrary (b) OAlgy is chosen OPTIMISTICFTL, (c)
OAlgx is MIRRORDESCENT with any non-increasing positive sequence {γt}, and (d) we have a
bound Vxt(x
∗) ≤ D for all t. Then the point x¯T satisfies
f(x¯T )−min
x∈X
f(x) ≤ 1
AT
(
D
γT
+
T∑
t=1
(
α2t
At
L− 1
2γt
)
‖xt−1 − xt‖2
)
. (10)
Proof. We have already done the hard work to prove this theorem. Lemma 1 tells us we can bound
the error of x¯T by the ǫ error of the approximate equilibrium (x¯T , y¯T ). Theorem 1 tells us that the
pair (x¯T , y¯T ) derived from Algorithm 1 is controlled by the sum of averaged regrets of both players,
1
AT
(α-REGx + α-REGy). But we now have control over both of these two regret quantities, from
Lemmas 3 and 4. The right hand side of (10) is the sum of these bounds.
Theorem 2 is somewhat opaque without a specifying the sequence {αt}. But what we now show is
that the summation term vanishes when we can guarantee that
α2t
At
remains constant! This is where
we obtain the following fast rate.
Corollary 1. Following Theorem 2 with αt = t and for any non-increasing sequence γt satisfying
1
CL ≤ γt ≤ 14L for some constant C > 4, we have f(x¯T )−minx∈X f(x) ≤
2CLD
T 2
.
Proof. Observing At :=
t(t+1)
2 , the choice of {αt, γt} implies Dγt ≤ cDL and
Lα2t
At
= 2Lt
2
t(t+1) ≤
2L ≤ 12γt , which ensures that the summation term in (10) is negative. The rest is simple algebra.
A straightforward choice for the learning rate γt is simple the constant sequence γt =
1
4L . The corol-
lary is stated with a changing γt in order to bring out a connection to the classical NESTEROVAC-
CELERATION in the following section.
Remark: It is worth dwelling on exactly how we obtained the above result. A less refined analysis
of the MIRRORDESCENT algorithm would have simply ignored the negative summation term in
Lemma 4, and simply upper bounded this by 0. But the negative terms ‖xt − xt−1‖2 in this sum
happen to correspond exactly to the positive terms one obtains in the regret bound for the y-player,
but this is true only as a result of using the OPTIMISTICFTL algorithm. To obtain a cancellation of
these terms, we need a γt which is roughly constant, and hence we need to ensure that
α2t
At
= O(1).
The final bound, of course, is determined by the inverse quantity 1AT , and a quick inspection reveals
that the best choice of αt = θ(t). This is not the only choice that could work, and we conjecture
that there are scenarios in which better bounds are achievable for different αt tuning. We show in
Section 4.3 that a linear rate is achievable when f(·) is also strongly convex, and there we tune αt
to grow exponentially in t rather than linearly.
4 Nesterov’s methods are instances of our accelerated solution to the game
Starting from 1983, Nesterov has proposed three accelerated methods for smooth convex problems
(i.e. [19, 18, 20, 22]. In this section, we show that our accelerated algorithm to the Fenchel game
can generate all his methods with some simple tweaks.
4.1 Recovering Nesterov’s (1983) method for unconstrained smooth convex problems
[19, 18]
In this subsection, we assume that the x-player’s action space is unconstrained. That is, K = Rn.
Consider the following algorithm.
Theorem 3. Let αt = t. Assume K = Rn. Algorithm 2 is actually the case the x-player uses
MIRRORDESCENT. Therefore, x¯T is an O(
1
T 2 )-approximate optimal solution ofminx f(x) by The-
orem 2 and Corollary 1.
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Algorithm 2 A variant of our accelerated algorithm.
1: In the weighted loss setting of Algorithm 1:
2: y-player uses OPTIMISITCFTL as OAlgy: yt = ∇f(x˜t).
3: x-player uses ONLINEGRADIENTDESCENT as OAlgx:
4: xt = xt−1 − γtαt∇ht(x) = xt−1 − γtαtyt = xt−1 − γtαt∇f(x˜t).
Proof. For the unconstrained case, we can let the distance generating function of the Bregman
divergence to be the squared of L2 norm, i.e. φ(x) := 12‖x‖22. Then, the update becomes
xt = argminx γt〈x, αtyt〉+Vxt−1(x) = argminx γt〈x, αtyt〉+ 12‖x‖22−〈xt−1, x−xt−1〉− 12‖xt−1‖22.
Differentiating the objective w.r.t x and setting it to zero, one will get xt = xt−1 − γtαtyt.
Having shown that Algorithm 2 is actually our accelerated algorithm to the Fenchel game. We
are going to show that Algorithm 2 has a direct correspondence with Nesterov’s first acceleration
method (Algorithm 3) [19, 18] (see also [27]).
Algorithm 3 Nesterov Algorithm [[19, 18]]
1: Init: w0 = z0. Require: θ ≤ 1L .
2: for t = 1, 2, . . . , T do
3: wt = zt−1 − θ∇f(zt−1).
4: zt = wt +
t−1
t+2 (wt − wt−1).
5: end for
6: Output wT .
To see the equivalence, let us re-write x¯t :=
1
At
∑t
s=1 αsxs of Algorithm 2.
x¯t =
At−1x¯t−1+αtxt
At
= At−1x¯t−1+αt(xt−1−γtαt∇f(x˜t))At
=
At−1x¯t−1+αt(
At−1x¯t−1−At−2x¯t−2
αt−1
−γtαt∇f(x˜t))
At
= x¯t−1(
At−1
At
+ αt(αt−1+At−2)Atαt−1 )− x¯t−2(
αtAt−2
Atαt−1
)− γtα2tAt ∇f(x˜t)
= x¯t−1 − γtα
2
t
At
∇f(x˜t) + (αtAt−2Atαt−1 )(x¯t−1 − x¯t−2)
= x¯t−1 − 14L∇f(x˜t) + ( t−2t+1 )(x¯t−1 − x¯t−2),
(11)
where αt = t and γt =
(t+1)
t
1
8L .
Theorem 4. Algorithm 3 with θ = 14L is equivalent to Algorithm 2 with γt =
(t+1)
t
1
8L in the sense
that they generate equivalent sequences of iterates:
for all t = 1, 2, . . . , T, wt = x¯t and zt−1 = x˜t.
Let us switch to comparing the update of Algorithm 2, which is (11), with the update of the HEAVY-
BALL algorithm. We see that (11) has the so called momentum term (i.e. has a (x¯t−1 − x¯t−2)
term). But, the difference is that the gradient is evaluated at x˜t =
1
At
(αtxt−1 +
∑t−1
s=1 αsxs),
not x¯t−1 = 1At−1
∑t−1
s=1 αsxs, which is the consequence that the y-player plays OPTIMISTICFTL.
To elaborate, let us consider a scenario (shown in Algorithm 4) such that the y-player plays FOL-
LOWTHELEADER instead of OPTIMISTICFTL.
Algorithm 4 HEAVYBALL algorithm
1: In the weighted loss setting of Algorithm 1:
2: y-player uses FOLLOWTHELEADER as OAlgy: yt = ∇f(x¯t−1).
3: x-player uses ONLINEGRADIENTDESCENT as OAlgx:
4: xt := xt−1 − γtαt∇ht(x) = xt−1 − γtαtyt = xt−1 − γtαt∇f(x¯t−1).
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Following what we did in (11), we can rewrite x¯t of Algorithm 4 as
x¯t = x¯t−1 − γtα
2
t
At
∇f(x¯t−1) + (x¯t−1 − x¯t−2)(αtAt−2Atαt−1 ), (12)
by observing that (11) still holds except that ∇f(x˜t) is changed to ∇f(x¯t−1) as the y-player uses
FOLLOWTHELEADER now, which give us the update of the Heavy Ball algorithm as (12). Moreover,
by the regret analysis, we have the following theorem. The proof is in Appendix C.
Theorem 5. Let αt = t. Assume K = Rn. Also, let γt = O( 1L ). The output x¯T of Algorithm 4 is
an O( 1T )-approximate optimal solution of minx f(x).
To conclude, by comparing Algorithm 2 and Algorithm 4, we see that Nesterov‘s (1983) method
enjoys O(1/T 2) rate since its adopts OPTIMISTICFTL, while the HEAVYBALL algorithm which
adopts FTL may not enjoy the fast rate, as the distance terms may not cancel out. The result also
conforms to empirical studies that the HEAVYBALL does not exhibit acceleration on general smooth
convex problems.
4.2 Recovering Nesterov’s (1988) 1-memory method [20] and Nesterov’s (2005)∞-memory
method [22]
In this subsection, we consider recovering Nesterov’s (1988) 1-memorymethod [20] and Nesterov’s
(2005)∞-memory method [22]. To be specific, we adopt the presentation of Nesterov’s algorithm
given in Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 3 of [29] respectively.
Algorithm 5 (A) Nesterov’s 1-memory method [20] and (B) Nesterov’s∞-memory method [22]
1: Input: parameter βt =
2
t+1 , γ
′
t =
t
4L , θt = t, and η =
1
4L .
2: Init: w0 = x0
3: for t = 1, 2, . . . , T do
4: zt = (1− βt)wt−1 + βtxt−1.
5: (A) xt = argminx∈K γ
′
t〈∇f(zt), x〉+ Vxt−1(x).
6: Or, (B) xt = argminx∈K
∑t
s=1 θs〈x,∇f(zs)〉+ 1ηR(x), where R(·) is 1-strongly convex.
7: wt = (1− βt)wt−1 + βtxt.
8: end for
9: Output wT .
Theorem 6. Let αt = t. Algorithm 5 with update by option (A) is the case when the y-player
uses OPTIMISTICFTL and the x-player adopts MIRRORDESCENT with γt =
1
4L in Fenchel game.
Therefore, wT is an O(
1
T 2 )-approximate optimal solution ofminx∈K f(x).
The proof is in Appendix D, which shows the direct correspondence of Algorithm 5 using option
(A) to our accelerated solution in Section 3.
Theorem 7. Let αt = t. Algorithm 5 with update by option (B) is the case when the y-player uses
OPTIMISTICFTL and the x-player adopts BETHEREGULARIZEDLEADER with η = 14L in Fenchel
game. Therefore, wT is an O(
1
T 2 )-approximate optimal solution ofminx∈K f(x).
The proof is in Appendix E, which requires the regret bound of BETHEREGULARIZEDLEADER.
4.3 Accelerated linear rate
Nesterov observed that, when f(·) is both µ-strongly convex and L-smooth, one can achieve a rate
that is exponentially decaying in T (e.g. page 71-81 of [21]). It is natural to ask if the zero-sum
game and regret analysis in the present work also recovers this faster rate in the same fashion. We
answer this in the affirmative. Denote κ := Lµ . A property of f(x) being µ-strongly convex is
that the function f˜(x) := f(x) − µ‖x‖222 is still a convex function. Now we define a new game
whose payoff function is g˜(x, y) := 〈x, y〉 − f˜∗(y) + µ‖x‖222 . Then, the minimax vale of the game
is V ∗ := minxmaxy g˜(x, y) = minx f˜(x) +
µ‖x‖22
2 = minx f(x). Observe that, in this game, the
loss of the y-player in round t is αtℓt(y) := αt(f˜
∗(y) − 〈xt, y〉), while the loss of the x-player in
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round t is a strongly convex function αtht(y) := αt(〈x, yt〉+ µ‖x‖
2
2
2 ). The cumulative loss function
of the x-player becomes more and more strongly convex over time, which is the key to allowing
the exponential growth of the total weight At that leads to the linear rate. In this setup, we have a
“warmup round” t = 0, and thus we denote A˜t :=
∑t
s=0 αs which incorporate the additional step
into the average. The proof of the following result is in Appendix H.
Theorem 8. For the game g˜(x, y) := 〈x, y〉− f˜∗(y)+ µ‖x‖222 , if the y-player plays OPTIMISTICFTL
and the x-player plays BETHEREGULARIZEDLEADER: xt ← argminx∈X
∑t
s=0 αsℓs(x), where
α0ℓ0(x) := α0
µ‖x‖22
2 , then the weighted average points (x¯T , y¯T ) would be an O(exp(− T√κ ))-
approximate equilibrium of the game, where the weights α0, α1, . . . are chosen to satisfy
αt
A˜t
= 1√
6κ
.
This implies that f(x¯T )−minx∈X f(x) = O(exp(− T√κ )).
5 Accelerated Proximal Method
In this section, we consider solving composite optimization problemsminx∈Rn f(x)+ψ(x), where
f(·) is smooth convex but ψ(·) is possibly non-differentiable convex (e.g. ‖ · ‖1). We want to
show that the game analysis still applies to this problem. We just need to change the payoff func-
tion g to account for ψ(x). Specifically, we consider the following two-players zero-sum game,
minxmaxy{〈x, y〉−f∗(y)+ψ(x)}. Notice that the minimax value of the game isminx f(x)+ψ(x),
which is exactly the optimum value of the composite optimization problem. Let us denote the prox-
imal operator as proxλψ(v) = argminx
(
ψ(x) + 12λ‖x− v‖22
)
. 1
Algorithm 6 Accelerated Proximal Method
1: In the weighted loss setting of Algorithm 1 (let αt = t and γt =
1
4L ):
2: y-player uses OPTIMISITCFTL as OAlgy: yt = ∇f(x˜t).
3: x-player uses MIRRORDESCENT with ψ(x) := 12‖x‖22 in Bregman divergence as OAlgx:
4: xt = argminx γt(αtht(x)) + Vxt−1(x) = argminx γt(αt{〈x, yt〉+ ψ(x)}) + Vxt−1(x)
5: = argminx φ(x) +
1
2αtγt
(‖x‖22 +2〈αtγtyt−xt−1, x〉) = proxαtγtψ(xt−1−αtγt∇f(x˜t))
We notice that the loss function of the x-player here, αtht(x) = αt(〈x, yt〉 + ψ(x)), is possibly
nonlinear. Yet, we can slightly adapt the analysis in Section 3 to show that the weighed average x¯T
is still an O(1/T 2) approximate optimal solution of the offline problem. Please see Appendix I for
details. One can view Algorithm 6 as a variant of the so called “Accelerated Proximal Gradient”in
[6]. Yet, the design and analysis of our algorithm is simpler than that of [6].
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A Two key lemmas
Lemma 4 Let the sequence of xt’s be chosen according to MIRRORDESCENT. Assume that the
Bregman Divergence is uniformly bounded on K, so that D = supt=1,...,T Vxt(x∗), where x∗ de-
notes the minimizer of f(·). Assume that the sequence {γt}t=1,2,... is non-increasing. Then we have
α-REGx ≤ DγT −
∑T
t=1
1
2γt
‖xt−1 − xt‖2.
Proof. The key inequality we need, which can be found in Lemma 1 of [25] (and for completeness
is included in Appendix A) is as follows: let y, c be arbitrary, and assume x+ = argminx∈K〈x, y〉 +
Vc(x), then for any x
∗ ∈ K, 〈x+ − x∗, y〉 ≤ Vc(x∗) − Vx+(x∗) − Vc(x+). Now apply this fact for
x+ = xt, y = γtαtyt and c = xt−1, which provides
〈xt − x∗, γtαtyt〉 ≤ Vxt−1(x∗)− Vxt(x∗)− Vxt−1(xt). (13)
So, the weighted regret of the x-player can be bounded by
α-REGx :=
∑T
t=1 αt〈xt − x∗, yt〉
(13)
≤ ∑Tt=1 1γt (Vxt−1(x∗)− Vxt(x∗)− Vxt−1(xt))
= 1γ1Vx0(x
∗)− 1γT vxT (x∗) +
∑T−1
t=1 (
1
γt+1
− 1γt )Vxt(x∗)− 1γt Vxt−1(xt)
(a)
≤ 1γ1D +
∑T−1
t=1 (
1
γt+1
− 1γt )D − 1γtVxt−1(xt) = DγT −
∑T
t=1
1
γt
Vxt−1(xt)
(b)
≤ DγT −
∑T
t=1
1
2γt
‖xt−1 − xt‖2,
(14)
where (a) holds since the sequence {γt} is non-increasing andD upper bounds the divergence terms,
and (b) follows from the strong convexity of φ, which grants Vxt−1(xt) ≥ 12‖xt − xt−1‖2.
The above lemma requires a bound D on the divergence terms Vxt(x
∗), which might be large in
certain unconstrained settings – recall that we do no necessarily require that K is a bounded set,
we only assume that f(·) is minimized at a point with finite norm. On the other hand, when the
x-player’s learning rate γ is fixed, we can define the more natural choiceD = Vx0(x
∗).
Lemma 4 [Alternative]: Let the sequence of xt’s be chosen according to MIRRORDESCENT, and
assume γt = γ for all t. Let D = Vx0(x
∗), where x∗ denotes the benchmark in α-REGx. Then we
have α-REGx ≤ Dγ −
∑T
t=1
1
2γ ‖xt−1 − xt‖2.
Proof. The proof follows exactly as before, yet γt = γt+1 for all t implies that
1
γt+1
− 1γt = 0 and
we may drop the sum in the third line of (14). The rest of the proof is identical.
Lemma 1 of [25]: Let x′ = argminx∈K〈x, y〉+ Vc(x). Then, it satisfies that for any x∗ ∈ K,
〈x′ − x∗, y〉 ≤ Vc(x∗)− Vx′(x∗)− Vc(x′). (15)
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Proof. Recall that the Bregman divergence with respect to the distance generating function φ(·) at
a point c is: Vc(x) := φ(x) − 〈∇φ(c), x − c〉 − φ(c).
Denote F (x) := 〈x, y〉 + Vc(x). Since x′ is the optimal point of argminx∈K F (x), by optimality,
〈x∗ − x′,∇F (x′)〉 ≥ 0, for any x∗ ∈ K . So,
〈x∗ − x′,∇F (x′)〉 = 〈x∗ − x′, y〉+ 〈x∗ − x′,∇φ(x′)−∇φ(c)〉
= 〈x∗ − x′, y〉+ {φ(x∗)− 〈∇φ(c), x∗ − c〉 − φ(c)} − {φ(x∗)− 〈∇φ(x′), x∗ − x′〉 − φ(x′)}
− {φ(x′)− 〈∇φ(c), x′ − c〉 − φ(c)}
= 〈x∗ − x′, y〉+ Vc(x∗)− Vx′(x∗)− Vc(x′) ≥ 0.
(16)
The last inequality means that
〈x′ − x∗, y〉 ≤ Vc(x∗)− Vx′(x∗)− Vc(x′). (17)
B Proof of Theorem 4
Theorem 4 Algorithm 3 with θ = 14L is equivalent to Algorithm 2 with γt =
(t+1)
t
1
8L in the sense
that they generate equivalent sequences of iterates:
for all t = 1, 2, . . . , T, wt = x¯t and zt−1 = x˜t.
Proof. First, let us check the base case to see if w1 = x¯1. We have that w1 = z0 − θ∇f(z0) from
line 3 of Algorithm 3, while x¯1 = x¯0 − 14L∇f(x˜1) in (11). Thus, if the initialization is the same:
w0 = z0 = x0 = x¯0 = x˜1, then w1 = x¯1.
Now assume that wt−1 = x¯t−1 holds for a t ≥ 2. Then, from the expression of line 4 that zt−1 =
wt−1 + t−2t+1 (wt−1 − wt−2), we get zt−1 = x¯t−1 + t−2t+1 (x¯t−1 − x¯t−2). Let us analyze that the
r.h.s of the equality. The coefficient of xt−1 in x¯t−1 + t−2t+1 (x¯t−1 − x¯t−2) is
(t−1)+ t−2
t+1 (t−1)
At−1
=
2(1+ t−2
t+1 )
t =
2(2t−1)
t(t+1) , while the coefficient of each xτ for any τ ≤ t− 2 in x¯t−1 + t−2t+1 (x¯t−1− x¯t−2)
is
(1+ t−2
t+1 )τ
At−1
− t−2t+1 τAt−2 = {
2(2t−1)
(t−1)t(t+1) − 2(t+1)(t−1)} × τ = { 2(t−1)(t+1)
(
2t−1
t − 1
)} × τ =
2τ
t(t+1) . Yet, the coefficient of xt−1 in x˜t is
t+(t−1)
At
= 2(2t−1)t(t+1) and the coefficient of xτ in x˜t is
τ
At
= 2τt(t+1) for any τ ≤ t − 2. Thus, zt−1 = x˜t. Now observe that if zt−1 = x˜t, we get
wt = x¯t. To see this, substituting zt−1 = wt−1 + t−2t+1 (wt−1 − wt−2) of line 4 into line 3, we get
wt = wt−1 + t−2t+1 (wt−1 − wt−2)− θ∇f(zt−1). By using zt−1 = x˜t and wt−1 = x¯t−1, we further
get wt = x¯t−1 + t−2t+1 (x¯t−1 − x¯t−2)− θ∇f(x˜t) = x¯t. We can repeat the argument to show that the
correspondence holds for any t, which establishes the equivalency.
Notice that the choice of decreasing sequence {γt} here can still make the distance terms in (10)
cancel out. So, we get O(1/T 2) rate by the guarantee.
C Proof of Theorem 5
Theorem 5 Let αt = t. Assume K = Rn. Also, let γt = O( 1L ). The output x¯T of Algorithm 4 is an
O( 1T )-approximate optimal solution of minx f(x).
Proof. To analyze the guarantee of x¯T of Algorithm 4, we use the following lemma about FOL-
LOWTHELEADER for strongly convex loss functions.
Corollary 1 from [13] Let ℓ1, ..., ℓT be a sequence of functions such that for all t ∈ [T ], ℓt is
σt-strongly convex. Assume that FOLLOWTHELEADER runs on this sequence and for each t ∈ [T ],
let θt be in∇ℓt(yt). Then,
∑T
t=1 ℓt(yt)−minx
∑T
t=1 ℓt(y) ≤ 12
∑T
t=1
‖θt‖2∑
t
τ=1 στ
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Observe that the y-player plays FOLLOWTHELEADER on the loss function sequence αtℓt(y) :=
αt(−〈xt, y〉 + f∗(y)), whose strong convexity parameter is αtL (due to f∗(y) is 1L -strongly convex
by duality). Also, ∇ℓt(yt) = −xt + ∇f∗(yt) = −xt + x¯t−1, where the last inequality is due
to that if yt = argmaxy〈 1At−1
∑t−1
s=1 αsxs, y〉 − f∗(y) = ∇f(x¯t−1), then x¯t−1 = ∇f∗(yt) by
duality. So, we have α-REG
y AboveCor.≤ 12AT
∑T
t=1
α2t‖x¯t−1−xt‖2∑
t
τ=1 ατ (1/L)
= 12AT
∑T
t=1
α2tL‖x¯t−1−xt‖2
At
=
O(
∑T
τ=1
L‖x¯t−1−xt‖2
AT
). For the x-player, it is an instance of MIRRORDESCENT, so α-REG
x
:=
1
AT
∑T
t=1〈xt−x∗, αtyt〉 ≤
1
γT
D−∑Tt=1 12γt ‖xt−1−xt‖
2
AT
Therefore, x¯T of Algorithm 4 is anα-REG
x
+
α-REG
y
= O(
L
∑T
t=1(‖x¯t−1−xt‖2−‖xt−xt−1‖2)
AT
) -approximate optimal solution. Since the distance
terms may not cancel out, one may only bound the differences of the distance terms by a constant,
which leads to the non-acceleratedO(1/T ) rate.
D Proof of Theorem 6
Theorem 6 Let αt = t. Algorithm 5 with update by option (A) is the case when the y-player
uses OPTIMISTICFTL and the x-player adopts MIRRORDESCENT with γt =
1
4L in Fenchel game.
Therefore, wT is an O(
1
T 2 )-approximate optimal solution ofminx∈K f(x).
Proof. We first prove by induction showing that wt in Algorithm 5 is
∑t
s=1
αs
At
xs for any t > 0.
For the base case t = 1, we have w1 = (1 − β1)w0 + β1x1 = x1 = α1A1x1. Now suppose that the
equivalency holds at t− 1, for a t ≥ 2. Then,
wt = (1− βt)wt−1 + βtxt (a)= (1 − βt)(
∑t−1
s=1
αs
At−1
xs) + βtxt
= (1− 2t+1 )(
∑t−1
s=1
αs
t(t−1)
2
xs) + βtxt =
∑t−1
s=1
αs
t(t+1)
2
xs +
αt
At
xt =
∑t
s=1
αs
As
xs,
(18)
where (a) is by induction. So, it holds at t too. Now we are going to show that zt =
1
At
(αtxt−1 +∑t−1
s=1 αsxs) = x˜t. We have that zt = (1−βt)wt−1+βtxt−1 = (1−βt)(
∑t−1
s=1
αs
At−1
xs)+βtxt−1 =
(1 − 2t+1 )(
∑t−1
t=1
αt
t(t−1)
2
xt) + βtxt−1 =
∑t−1
s=1
αs
t(t+1)
2
xs + βtxt−1 =
∑t−1
s=1
αs
At
xs +
αt
At
xt−1 = x˜t.
The result also means that ∇f(zt) = ∇f(x˜t) = yt of the y-player who plays Optimistic-FTL in
Algorithm 1. Furthermore, it shows that line 5 of Algorithm 5: xt = argminx∈K γ
′
t〈∇f(zt), x〉 +
Vxt−1(x) is exactly (9) of MIRRORDESCENT in Fenchel game. Also, from (18), the last iterate wT
in Algorithm 5 corresponds to the final output of our accelerated solution to Fenchel game, which is
the weighted average point that enjoys the guarantee by the game analysis.
E Proof of Theorem 7
Theorem 7 Let αt = t. Algorithm 5 with update by option (B) is the case when the y-player uses
OPTIMISTICFTL and the x-player adopts BETHEREGULARIZEDLEADER with η = 14L in Fenchel
game. Therefore, wT is an O(
1
T 2 )-approximate optimal solution ofminx∈K f(x).
Proof. Consider in Fenchel game that the y-player uses OPTIMISTICFTL while the x-player plays
according to BTRL:
xt = argminx∈K
∑T
t=1〈xt, αtyt〉+ 1ηR(x),
where R(·) is a 1-strongly convex function. Define, z = argminx∈KR(x). Form [1] (also see
Appendix F), it shows that BTRL has regret
Regret :=
∑T
t=1〈xt − x∗, αtyt〉 ≤
R(x∗)−R(z)− 12
∑T
t=1 ‖xt−xt−1‖2
η , (19)
where x∗ is the benchmark/comparator defined in the definition of the weighted regret (4).
By combining (8) and (19), we get that
α-REGx+α-REGy
AT
=
R(x∗)−R(z)
η
+
∑T
t=1(
α2t
At
L− 12η )‖xt−1−xt‖2
AT
≤ O(L(R(x∗)−R(z))T 2 ), (20)
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where the last inequality is because η = 14L so that the distance terms cancel out. So, by Lemma 1
and Theorem 1 again, we know that x¯T is an O(
1
T 2 )-approximate optimal solution ofminx∈K f(x).
The remaining thing to do is showing that x¯T is actually wT of Algorithm 5 with option (B). But,
this follows the same line as the proof of Theorem 6. So, we have completed the proof.
F Proof of BETHEREGULARIZEDLEADER ’s regret
For completeness, we replicate the proof in [1] about the regret bound of BETHEREGULAR-
IZEDLEADER in this section.
Theorem 10 of [[1]] Let θt be the loss vector in round t. Let the update of BTRL be xt =
argminx∈K〈x, Lt〉 + 1ηR(x), where R(·) is β-strongly convex. Denote z = argminx∈KR(x).
Then, BTRL has regret
Regret :=
∑T
t=1〈xt − x∗, θt〉 ≤ R(x
∗)−R(z)− β2
∑T
t=1 ‖xt−xt−1‖2
η . (21)
To analyze the regret of BETHEREGULARIZEDLEADER, let us consider OPTIMISTICFTRL first.
Let θt be the loss vector in round t and let the cumulative loss vector be Lt =
∑t
s=1 θs. The update
of OPTIMISTICFTRL is
xt = argminx∈K〈x, Lt−1 +mt〉+ 1ηR(x), (22)
where mt is the learner’s guess of the loss vector in round t, R(·) is β-strong convex with respect
to a norm (‖ · ‖) and η is a parameter. Therefore, it is clear that the regret of BETHEREGULAR-
IZEDLEADER will be the one when OPTIMISTICFTRL ’s guess of the loss vectors exactly match
the true ones, i.e. mt = θt.
Theorem 16 of [[1]] Let θt be the loss vector in round t. Let the update of OPTIMISTICFTRL
be xt = argminx∈K〈x, Lt−1 + mt〉 + 1ηR(x), where mt is the learner’s guess of the loss vector
in round t and R(x) is a β-strongly convex function. Denote the update of standard FTRL as
zt = argminx∈K〈x, Lt−1〉+ 1ηR(x). Also, z1 = argminx∈KR(x). Then, OPTIMISTICFTRL (22)
has regret
Regret :=
∑T
t=1〈xt − x∗, θt〉 ≤ R(x
∗)−R(z1)−DT
η +
∑T
t=1
η
β ‖θt −mt‖2∗, (23)
where DT =
∑T
t=1
β
2 ‖xt − zt‖2 + β2 ‖xt − zt+1‖2, zt = argminx∈K〈x, Lt−1〉 + 1ηR(x), and
xt = argminx∈K〈x, Lt−1 +mt〉+ 1ηR(x).
Recall that the update of BETHEREGULARIZEDLEADER is xt = argminx∈K〈x, Lt〉 + 1ηR(x),
Therefore, we have thatmt = θt and xt = zt+1 in the regret bound of OPTIMISTICFTRL indicated
by the theorem. Consequently, we get that the regret of BETHEREGULARIZEDLEADER satisfies
Regret :=
∑T
t=1〈xt − x∗, θt〉 ≤ R(x
∗)−R(z)− β2
∑T
t=1 ‖xt−xt−1‖2
η . (24)
G Proof of OPTIMISTICFTRL ’s regret
For completeness, we replicate the proof in [1] about the regret bound of OPTIMISTICFTRL in this
section.
Theorem 16 of [[1]] Let θt be the loss vector in round t. Let the update of OPTIMISTICFTRL
be xt = argminx∈K〈x, Lt−1 + mt〉 + 1ηR(x), where mt is the learner’s guess of the loss vector
in round t and R(x) is a β-strongly convex function. Denote the update of standard FTRL as
zt = argminx∈K〈x, Lt−1〉+ 1ηR(x). Also, z1 = argminx∈KR(x). Then, OPTIMISTICFTRL (22)
has regret
Regret :=
∑T
t=1〈xt − x∗, θt〉 ≤ R(x
∗)−R(z1)−DT
η +
∑T
t=1
η
β ‖θt −mt‖2∗, (25)
where DT =
∑T
t=1
β
2 ‖xt − zt‖2 + β2 ‖xt − zt+1‖2, zt = argminx∈K〈x, Lt−1〉 + 1ηR(x), and
xt = argminx∈K〈x, Lt−1 +mt〉+ 1ηR(x).
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Proof. Define zt = argminx∈K〈x, Lt−1〉 + 1ηR(x) as the update of the standard FOLLOW-THE-
REGULARIZED-LEADER. We can re-write the regret as
Regret :=
∑T
t=1〈xt − x∗, θt〉 =
∑T
t=1〈xt − zt+1, θt −mt〉+
∑T
t=1〈xt − zt+1,mt〉+ 〈zt+1 − x∗, θt〉
(26)
Let us analyze the first sum ∑T
t=1〈xt − zt+1, θt −mt〉. (27)
Now using Lemma 17 of [1] (which is also stated below) with x1 = xt, u1 =
∑t−1
s=1 θs +mt and
x2 = zt+1, u2 =
∑t
s=1 θs in the lemma, we have∑T
t=1〈xt − zt+1, θt −mt〉 ≤
∑T
t=1 ‖xt − zt+1‖‖θt −mt‖∗ ≤
∑T
t=1
η
β ‖θt −mt‖2∗. (28)
For the other sum, ∑T
t=1〈xt − zt+1,mt〉+ 〈zt+1 − x∗, θt〉, (29)
we are going to show that, for any T ≥ 0, it is upper-bounded by R(x∗)−R(z1)−DTη , which holds for
any x∗ ∈ K, where DT =
∑T
t=1
β
2 ‖xt − zt‖2 + β2 ‖xt − zt+1‖2. For the base case T = 0, we see
that ∑0
t=1〈xt − zt+1,mt〉+ 〈zt+1 − x∗, θt〉 = 0 ≤ R(x
∗)−R(z1)−0
η , (30)
as z1 = argminx∈KR(x).
Using induction, assume that it also holds for T − 1 for a T ≥ 1. Then, we have∑T
t=1〈xt − zt+1,mt〉+ 〈zt+1, θt〉
(a)
≤ 〈xT − zT+1,mT 〉+ 〈zT+1, θT 〉+ R(zT )−R(z1)−DT−1η + 〈zT , LT−1〉
(b)
≤ 〈xT − zT+1,mT 〉+ 〈zT+1, θT 〉+ R(xT )−R(z1)−DT−1−
β
2 ‖xT−zT ‖2
η + 〈xT , LT−1〉
= 〈zT+1, θT −mT 〉+ R(xT )−R(z1)−DT−1−
β
2 ‖xT−zT ‖2
η + 〈xT , LT−1 +mT 〉
(c)
≤ 〈zT+1, θT −mT 〉+ R(zT+1)−R(z1)−DT−1−
β
2 ‖xT−zT ‖2− β2 ‖xT−zT+1‖2
η
+ 〈zT+1, LT−1 +mT 〉
= 〈zT+1, LT 〉+ R(zT+1)−R(z1)−DTη
(d)
≤ 〈x∗, LT 〉+ R(x
∗)−R(z1)−DT
η ,
(31)
where (a) is by induction such that the inequality holds at T − 1 for any x∗ ∈ K including x∗ = zT ,
(b) and (c) are by strong convexity so that
〈zT , LT−1〉+ R(zT )η ≤ 〈xT , LT−1〉+ R(xT )η − β2η ‖xT − zT‖2, (32)
and
〈xT , LT−1 +mT 〉+ R(xT )η ≤ 〈zT+1, LT−1 +mT 〉+ R(zT+1)η − β2η ‖xT − zT+1‖2, (33)
and (d) is because zT+1 is the optimal point of argminx〈x, LT 〉 + R(x)η . We’ve completed the
induction.
Lemma 17 of [[1]] Denote x1 = argminx〈x, u1〉+ 1ηR(x) and x2 = argminx〈x, u2〉+ 1ηR(x) for
a β-strongly convex function R(·) with respect to a norm ‖ · ‖. We have ‖x1 − x2‖ ≤ ηβ ‖u1 − u2‖∗.
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H Proof of Theorem 8
Theorem 8 For the game g(x, y) := 〈x, y〉− f˜∗(y)+ µ‖x‖222 , if the y-player plays OPTIMISTICFTL
and the x-player plays BETHEREGULARIZEDLEADER: xt ← argminx∈X
∑t
s=0 αsℓs(x), where
α0ℓ0(x) := α0
µ‖x‖22
2 , then the weighted average (x¯T , y¯T ) would be O(exp(− T√κ ))-approximate
equilibrium of the game, where the weights αt
A˜t
= 1√
6κ
. This implies that f(x¯T )−minx∈X f(x) =
O(exp(− T√
κ
)).
Proof. From Lemma 3, we know that the y-player’s regret by OPTIMISTICFTL is∑T
t=1 αtℓt(y˜t)− αtℓt(y∗) ≤
∑T
t=1 δt(y˜t)− δt(yˆt+1)
=
∑T
t=1 αt〈xt−1 − xt, y˜t − yˆt+1〉
(Eqns. 5, 6) =
∑T
t=1 αt〈xt−1 − xt,∇f˜(x˜t)−∇f˜(x¯t)〉
(Hölder’s Ineq.) ≤ ∑Tt=1 αt‖xt−1 − xt‖‖∇f˜(x˜t)−∇f˜(x¯t)‖
=
∑T
t=1 αt‖xt−1 − xt‖‖∇f(x˜t)− µx˜t −∇f˜(x¯t) + µx¯t‖
(triangle inequality) ≤ ∑Tt=1 αt‖xt−1 − xt‖(‖∇f(x˜t)−∇f˜(x¯t)‖+ µ‖x¯t − x˜t‖)
(L-smoothness and L ≥ µ) ≤ 2L∑Tt=1 αt‖xt−1 − xt‖‖x˜t − x¯t‖
(Eqn. 7) = 2L
∑T
t=1
α2t
At
‖xt−1 − xt‖‖xt−1 − xt‖
Therefore,
α-REGy ≤ 2L∑Tt=1 α2tAt ‖xt−1 − xt‖2. (34)
For the x-player, its loss function in round t is αtℓt(x) := αt(µφ(x) + 〈x, yt〉), where φ(x) :=
1
2‖x‖22. Assume the x-player plays BETHEREGULARIZEDLEADER,
xt ← argmin
x∈X
t∑
s=0
αsℓs(x), (35)
where α0ℓ0(x) := α0µφ(x). Denote
A˜t :=
t∑
s=0
αs. (36)
Notice that this is different from At :=
∑t
s=1 αs. Then, its regret is (proof is on the next page)
α-REGx :=
∑T
t=1 αtℓt(xt)− αtℓt(x∗) ≤ α0µL0‖x∗ − x0‖ −
∑T
t=1
µA˜t−1
2 ‖xt−1 − xt‖2, (37)
where L0 is the Lipchitz constant of the 1-strongly convex function φ(x) and x0 = argminx φ(x).
Summing (34) and (37), we have
α-REGy +α-REGx ≤ α0µL0‖x∗ − x0‖+
T∑
t=1
(
2Lα2t
At
− µA˜t−1
2
)‖xt−1 − xt‖2. (38)
We want to let the distance terms cancel out.
2Lα2t
A˜t − a0
− µA˜t−1
2
≤ 0, (39)
which is equivalent to
4Lα2t ≤ µA˜tA˜t−1 − µα0A˜t−1.
4L
α2t
A˜t
2 ≤ µ
A˜t−1
A˜t
− µα0 A˜t−1
A˜t
1
A˜t
4L
α2t
A˜t
2 ≤ µ(1−
α0
A˜t
)(1 − αt
A˜t
)
(40)
16
Let us denote the constant θ := αt
A˜t
> 0.
θ2 +
µ
4L
(1− α0
A˜t
)θ − µ
4L
(1− α0
A˜t
) ≤ 0. (41)
Notice that 0 < α0
A˜t
≤ 1. It suffices to show that
θ2 +
µ
4L
(1 − α0
A˜t
)θ − µ
4L
≤ 0. (42)
Yet, we would expect that α0
A˜t
is a decreasing function of t, so it suffices to show that
θ2 +
µ
4L
(1 − α0
A˜1
)θ − µ
4L
≤ 0, (43)
which is equivalent to
θ2 +
µ
4L
α1
A˜1
θ − µ
4L
≤ 0
θ2(1 +
µ
4L
)− µ
4L
≤ 0.
(44)
It turns out that θ =
√ µ
6L =
1√
6κ
satisfies the above inequality, combining the fact that
µ
L ≤ 1.
Therefore, the optimization error ǫ after T iterations is
ǫ ≤ α-REG
y +α-REGx
AT
≤ 1
A1
A1
A2
· · · AT−1
AT
(α0µL0‖x∗ − x0‖)
=
1
A1
(1− α2
A2
) · · · (1− αT
AT
)(α0µL0‖x∗ − x0‖)
≤ 1
A1
(1− α2
A˜2
) · · · (1− αT
A˜T
)(α0µL0‖x∗ − x0‖)
≤ (1− 1√
6κ
)T−1
α0µL0
A1
‖x∗ − x0‖.
(45)
which is O((1 − 1√
6κ
)T ) = O(exp(− 1√
6κ
T )).
Proof. (of (37)) First, we are going to use induction to show that
τ∑
t=0
αtℓt(xt)− αtℓt(x∗) ≤ Dτ , (46)
for any x∗ ∈ X , whereDτ := −
∑τ
t=1
µA˜t−1
2 ‖xt−1 − xt‖2.
For the base case t = 0, we have
α0µφ(x0)− α0µφ(x∗) ≤ 0 = D0, (47)
where x0 is defined as x0 = argminx∈X α0µφ(x).
Now suppose it holds at t = τ − 1.
τ∑
t=0
αtℓt(xt)
(a)
≤ Dτ−1 + ατ ℓτ (xτ ) +
τ−1∑
t=0
αtℓt(xτ−1)
(b)
≤ Dτ−1 + ατ ℓτ (xτ ) +
τ−1∑
t=0
αtℓt(xτ )− A˜τ−1µ
2
‖xτ−1 − xτ‖2
= Dτ−1 +
τ∑
t=0
αtℓt(xτ )− A˜τ−1µ
2
‖xτ−1 − xτ‖2
= Dτ +
τ∑
t=0
αtℓt(xτ )
≤ Dτ +
τ∑
t=0
αtℓt(x
∗),
(48)
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for any x∗ ∈ X , where (a) we use the induction and we let the point x∗ = xτ−1 and (b) is
by the strongly convexity and that xτ−1 = argminx
∑τ−1
t=0 αtℓt(x) so that
∑τ−1
t=0 αtℓt(xτ−1) ≤∑τ−1
t=0 αtℓt(xτ ) − A˜τ−1µ2 ‖xτ−1 − xτ‖2 as
∑τ−1
t=0 αtℓt(x) is at least
A˜τ−1µ
2 -strongly convex. We
have completed the proof of (46). By (46), we have
α-REGx :=
∑T
t=1 αtℓt(xt)− αtℓt(x∗) ≤ α0µφ(x∗)− α0µφ(x0)−
∑T
t=1
µA˜t−1
2 ‖xt−1 − xt‖2.
≤ α0µL0‖x0 − x∗‖ −
T∑
t=1
µA˜t−1
2
‖xt−1 − xt‖2,
(49)
where we assume that φ(·) is L0-Lipchitz.
I Analysis of Accelerated Proximal Method
First, we need a stronger result.
Lemma [Property 1 in [29]] For any proper lower semi-continuous convex function θ(x), let x+ =
argminx∈K θ(x) + Vc(x). Then, it satisfies that for any x
∗ ∈ K,
θ(x+)− θ(x∗) ≤ Vc(x∗)− Vx+(x∗)− Vc(x+). (50)
Proof. The statement and its proof has also appeared in [8] and [14]. For completeness, we replicate
the proof here. Recall that the Bregman divergence with respect to the distance generating function
φ(·) at a point c is: Vc(x) := φ(x)− 〈∇φ(c), x − c〉 − φ(c).
Denote F (x) := θ(x) + Vc(x). Since x
+ is the optimal point of argminx∈K F (x), by optimality,
〈x∗ − x+,∇F (x+)〉 = 〈x∗ − x+, ∂θ(x+) +∇φ(x+)−∇φ(c)〉 ≥ 0, (51)
for any x∗ ∈ K .
Now using the definition of subgradient, we also have
θ(x∗) ≥ θ(x+) + 〈∂θ(x+), x∗ − x+〉. (52)
By combining (51) and (52), we have
θ(x∗) ≥ θ(x+) + 〈∂θ(x+), x∗ − x+〉.
≥ θ(x+) + 〈x∗ − x+,∇φ(c)−∇φ(x+)〉.
= θ(x+)− {φ(x∗)− 〈∇φ(c), x∗ − c〉 − φ(c)} + {φ(x∗)− 〈∇φ(x+), x∗ − x+〉 − φ(x+)}
+ {φ(x+)− 〈∇φ(c), x+ − c〉 − φ(c)}
= θ(x+)− Vc(x∗) + Vx+(x∗) + Vc(x+)
(53)
Recall MIRRORDESCENT ’s update xt = argminx γt(αtht(x))+Vxt−1 (x), where ht(x) = 〈x, yt〉+
ψ(x). Using the lemma with θ(x) = γt(αtht(x)), x
+ = xt and c = xt−1 we have that
γt(αtht(xt))− γt(αtht(x∗)) = θ(xt)− θ(x∗) ≤ Vxt−1(x∗)− Vxt(x∗)− Vxt−1(xt). (54)
Therefore, we have that
α-REGx :=
∑T
t=1 αtht(xt)−minx∈X
∑T
t=1 αtht(x)
(54)
≤ ∑Tt=1 1γt (Vxt−1(x∗)− Vxt(x∗)− Vxt−1(xt))
= 1γ1Vx0(x
∗)− 1γT vxT (x∗) +
∑T−1
t=1 (
1
γt+1
− 1γt )Vxt(x∗)− 1γtVxt−1(xt)
(a)
≤ 1γ1D +
∑T−1
t=1 (
1
γt+1
− 1γt )D − 1γtVxt−1(xt) = DγT −
∑T
t=1
1
γt
Vxt−1(xt)
(b)
≤ DγT −
∑T
t=1
1
2γt
‖xt−1 − xt‖2,
(55)
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where (a) holds since the sequence {γt} is non-increasing andD upper bounds the divergence terms,
and (b) follows from the strong convexity of φ, which grants Vxt−1(xt) ≥ 12‖xt − xt−1‖2. Now we
see that following the same lines as the proof in Section 3. We get that x¯T is an O(
1
T 2 ) approximate
optimal solution.
J Accelerated FRANKWOLFE
Algorithm 7 A new FW algorithm [[1]]
1: In the weighted loss setting of Algorithm 1:
2: for t = 1, 2, . . . , T do
3: y-player uses OPTIMISITCFTL as OAlgx: yt = ∇f(x˜t).
4: x-player uses BETHEREGULARIZEDLEADER with R(X) := 12γK(x)
2 as OAlgx:
5: Set (xˆt, ρt) = argmin
x∈K,ρ∈[0,1]
∑t
s=1 ρ〈x, αsys〉+ 1ηρ2 and play xt = ρtxˆt.
6: end for
[1] proposed a FRANKWOLFE like algorithm that not only requires a linear oracle but also enjoys
O(1/T 2) rate on all the known examples of strongly convex constraint sets that contain the origin,
like lp ball and Schatten p ball with p ∈ (1, 2]. Their analysis requires the assumption that the
underlying function is also strongly-convex to get the fast rate. To describe their algorithm, denoteK
be any closed convex set that contains the origin. Define “gauge function” ofK as γK(x) := inf{c ≥
0 : xc ∈ K}. Notice that, for a closed convexK that contains the origin,K = {x ∈ Rd : γK(x) ≤ 1}.
Furthermore, the boundary points on K satisfy γK(x) = 1.
[1] showed that the squared of a gauge function is strongly convex on the underlying K for all
the known examples of strongly convex sets that contain the origin. Algorithm 7 is the algorithm.
Clearly, Algorithm 7 is an instance of the meta-algorithm. We want to emphasize again that our anal-
ysis does not need the function f(·) to be strongly convex to show O(1/T 2) rate. We’ve improved
their analysis.
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K Proof of Theorem 1
For completeness, we replicate the proof by [1] here.
Theorem 1 Assume a T -length sequenceα are given. Suppose in Algorithm 1 the online learning al-
gorithms OAlgx and OAlgy have the α-weighted average regret α-REG
x
and α-REG
y
respectively.
Then the output (x¯T , y¯T ) is an ǫ-equilibrium for g(·, ·), with ǫ = α-REGx +α-REGy.
Proof. Suppose that the loss function of the x-player in round t is αtht(·) : X → R, where ht(·) :=
g(·, yt). The y-player, on the other hand, observes her own sequence of loss functionsαtℓt(·) : Y →
R, where ℓt(·) := −g(xt, ·).
1∑T
s=1 αs
T∑
t=1
αtg(xt, yt) =
1∑T
s=1 αs
T∑
t=1
−αtℓt(yt)
= − 1∑T
s=1 αs
inf
y∈Y
{
T∑
t=1
αtℓt(y)
}
− α-REG
y∑T
s=1 αs
= sup
y∈Y
{
1∑T
s=1 αs
T∑
t=1
αtg(xt, y)
}
−α-REGy
(Jensen) ≥ sup
y∈Y
g
(
1∑
T
s=1 αs
∑T
t=1 αtxt, y
)
−α-REGy (56)
= sup
y∈Y
g (x¯T , y)−α-REGy (57)
≥ inf
x∈X
sup
y∈Y
g (x, y)−α-REGy
Let us now apply the same argument on the right hand side, where we use the x-player’s regret
guarantee.
1∑T
s=1 αs
T∑
t=1
αtg(xt, yt) =
1∑T
s=1 αs
T∑
t=1
αtht(xt)
=
{
T∑
t=1
1∑T
s=1 αs
αtht(x)
}
+
α-REGx∑T
s=1 αs
=
{
T∑
t=1
1∑T
s=1 αs
αtg(x
∗, yt)
}
+α-REG
x
≤ g
(
x∗,
∑T
t=1
1∑
T
s=1 αs
αtyt
)
+α-REG
x
(58)
= g (x∗, y¯T ) +α-REG
x
(59)
≤ sup
y∈Y
g(x∗, y) +α-REG
x
Note that supy∈Y g(x
∗, y) = f(x∗) be the definition of the game g(·, ·) and by Fenchel con-
jugacy, hence we can conclude that supy∈Y g(x
∗, y) = infx∈X supy∈Y g(x, y) = V
∗ =
supy∈Y infx∈X g(x, y). Combining (57) and (59), we see that:
sup
y∈Y
g (x¯T , y)−α-REGy ≤ inf
x∈X
g (x, y¯T ) +α-REG
x
which implies that (x¯T , y¯T ) is an ǫ = α-REG
x
+α-REG
y
equilibrium.
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